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FOREWORD:
THE POWER OF PRESUMPTIONS
RANDY

E.

BARNE'IT*

Once you start to notice it, you see it everywhere. Burdenshifting is pervasive. I suppose I began to notice the power of
presumptions when examining how to protect the rights "retained by the people" referred to in the Ninth Amendment1 without having to enumerate each one. I proposed the creation of a
"presumption of liberty" that would extend the same protective
presumption now accorded freedom of speech to all other rightful exercises of liberty. This presumption would shift the burden
to the government to justify as necessary and proper any restriction on the rightful exercise of any liberty. 2
This idea had been stimulated by my reconsideration of the
constitutional theory embodied in Justice Stone's opinion in
United States v. Carolene Products. 3 Although footnote 4 is committed to memory by most professors of constitutional law, less welldiscussed today is the passage of the text it qualifies:
[T]he existence of facts supporting the legislative judgment is
to be presumed, for regulatory legislation affecting ordinary
commercial transactions is not to be pronounced unconstitutional unless in the light of the facts made known or generally
assumed it is of such a character as to preclude the assumption
that it rests upon some rational basis within the knowledge
and experience of the legislators.4

Footnote 4 then informs us that:
There may be a narrower scope for operation of this presumption of constitutionality when legislation appears on its face to be
within a specific prohibition of the Constitution, such as those

*

Professor of Law, Boston University School of Law.
1. See U.S. CoNST., amend. IX ("The enumeration, in the Constitution, of certain rights
shall not be construed to deny or disparage others retained by the people.").
2. See, e.g., Randy E. Barnett, Introduction: Implementing the Ninth Amendment, in 2 THE
RIGHTS RETAINED BY THE PEOPLE: THE HISTORY AND MEANING OF THE NINTH AMENDMENT 1
(Randy E. Barnett ed., 1993); Randy E. Barnett, Introduction: james Madison's Ninth Amendment, in 1 THE RIGHTS RETAINED BY THE PEOPLE: THE HISTORY AND MEANING OF THE NINTH
AMENDMENT 1 (Randy. E. Barnett ed., 1989).
3. 304 U.S. 144 (1937). This reconsideration had itself been stimulated by J.M. Balkin,
The Footnote, 83 Nw. U. L. REv. 279 (1989).
4. Id. at 152 (emphasis added). Even less well-discussed is the fact that the legislation at
issue in the case was a classic example of economic protectionism, in this case, of the dairy
industry. See Geoffrey P. Miller, The True Story of Carolene Products, 1987 SuP. CT. REv. 397.
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of the first ten amendments, which are deemed equal2' specific when held to be embraced within the Fourteenth.

In this way, the Court presumes that the Constitution grants near
plenary powers to Congress, unless that presumption is rebutted
in a way that meets the standards set by Footnote 4. Thus did the
power of presumptions effect a constitutional "revolution." 6
Though it was famously qualified by him, this shift of presumptions did not originate with Justice Stone. The seeds of this constitutional revolution were sown by Justice Brandeis in O'Gorman
and Young v. Hartford Insurance Co. 7 The significance of this case,
and the means that Brandeis employed to achieve his purposes,
did not go unnoticed or unheralded at the time. It is worth quoting at length from the pages of the Columbia Law Review the gushing comments penned by Walton Hamilton, an admiring Yale
Law School professor:
[T]he simple lines of [this] short opinion present a superb example of the jurist's art The catalogue of precedents is left to
the dissent; the technique of distinction would do no more
than serve the current need. There is no attempt to make out
a case; an elaborate argument, concerned with the insurance
business, filled with citations, and buttressed in footnotes
would save a single statute. The demand is to find an escape
from the recent holdings predicated upon "freedom of contract" as "the rule," from which a departure is to be allowed
only in exceptional cases; The occasion calls not for deft use of
tactics, but for a larger strategy. The device of presumption is
almost as old as law; Brandeis revives the presumption that
acts of a state legislature are valid and applies it to statutes
regulating business activity. The factual brief has many times
been employed to make a case for social legislation; Brandeis
5. /d. at 152 n.4 (emphasis added). Of course, the presumption is also said to have a
narrower scope when legislation "restricts •.• [the] political processes" or involves "preju·
dice against discrete and insular minorities." /d.
6. See, e.g., BRUCE A. ACKERMAN, WE THE PEOPLE: FouNDATIONS 40 (1991) (contending
that the "constitutional triumph of the activist welfare state" in 1937 was a genuine consti·
tutional revolution).
7. 282 U.S. 251 (1931). This strategy for limiting the scope of judicial review was not
his, however. It was proposed in 1893 by Harvard Law Professor James B. Thayer.
This rule recognizes that, having regard to the great, complex, ever-unfolding
exigencies of government, much will seem unconstitutional to one man, or body
of men, may reasonably not seem so to another; that the constitution often ad·
mits of different interpretations; that there is often a range of choice and judg·
ment; that in such cases the constitution does not impose upon the legislature
any one specific opinion, but leaves open this range of choice; and whatever
choice is rational is constitutional.
James B. Thayer, The Origin and Scope of the American Doctrine of Constitutional Law, 7 HARv.
L. REv. 129, 144 (1893).
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demands of the opponents of legislative acts a recitation offact showing that the evil did not exist or that the remedy was inappropriate.
He appeals from precedents to more venerable precedents,
reverses the rules of presumption and proof in cases involving
the control of industry; and sets up a realistic test of constitutionality. It is all done with such verisimilitude that a discussion of particular cases is unnecessary; it all seems obviousonce Brandeis has shown how the trick is done. It is attended
with so little of a fanfare ofjudicial trumpets that it might have
passed almost unnoticed, save for the dissenters, who usurp
the office of the chorus in a Greek tragedy and comment
upon the action. Yet an argument which degrades "freedom of
contract" to a constitutional doctrine of the second magnitude
is compressed into a single compelling paragraph.8

Professor Hamilton also noticed the peculiar power of presumptions when he observed that:
Brandeis has, to serve judicial necessity, remade an old device.
His presumption, rebuttable only by a recitation of fact, is a
compound of the older presumption of constitutionality and
Holmes' formula "It is not unconstitutional." The use of the
double negative may logically add nothing; but it has a high rhetorical
value, and has come to furnish a basis for an ingenious procedural device. 9

In his paean, however, Hamilton appears to have missed the
irony of the originator of the "Brandeis Brief"-the innovation
heralded as compelling the Supreme Court to come out of its
"formalist" shell and confront the hard facts of the real world10having adopted a presumption that made his "Legal Realist" empirical inquiry obsolete. Never again would a defender of socalled "economic" legislation have to present facts and evidence
8. Walton H. Hamilton, The jurist's Art, 31 CoLUM. L. REv. 1073, 1074-75 (19S1)(citations omitted) (emphasis added).
9. Jd. at 1074 n. 8 (emphasis added).
10. See John W.Johnson, Brandeis Brief, in THE OXFORD CoMPANION TO THE SuPREME
CoURT OF THE UNITED STATES 85 (Kermit L. Hall et al. eds., 1992):
Louis D. Brandeis, then a well-known attorney and social activist, submitted a
lengthy brief supporting the constitutionality of an Oregon statute that limited
the hours per day that women could work in laundries and other industries....
The MuUer brief devoted a mere two pages to discussion of legal issues; the
remaining 110 pages presented evidence of the deleterious effects oflong hours
of labor on the "health, safety, morals and general welfare of women." .••.
The MuUer briefs analysis was consonant with the fact-oriented "sociological
jurisprudence" of the Progressive era. It forced the Court to consider data that
state legislatures employed in drafting reform laws.
I find it necessary to include this quotation because most law students I have asked who
have taken constitutional law are unfamiliar with the tale. Perhaps the story is not
trumpeted today because the merits of this admirably realist device are so incongruous
with the unrealistic, but widely accepted, presumption of constitutionality.
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(unless the qualifications of Footnote 4 are implicated). Such
facts would . simply be presumed-well-nigh irrebuttablywhether or not they were true. Indeed, such "facts" would even
be made up by the Court itself. 11 So much for realism.l2
Once I began to think seriously about the power of presumptions in constitutional theory, it began to affect my thinking
about contract law as well. Contract scholars had long characterized as assent-based only those terms that were expressly assented
to, or those to which assent could be implied-in-fact. In contrast,
implied-in-law terms were thought to be imposed upon the parties
by the legal system. Contract scholars associated with Legal Realism had emphasized the inevitable incompleteness of expressed
or implied-in-fact contract terms based on consent, and therefore
the pervasiveness of terms that were implied-in-law for reasons
either of principle or of policy. Thus was it claimed that consent
was marginal to contract law, since contract law only applied
when there was a "gap" in ass.ent. How that gap should be filled
was therefore a matter of policy and certainly not, except wholly
fictitiously, a matter of the parties' consent. In sum, the law of
contract had little, if anything, to do with contractual consent
because contract law operated precisely when consent gave outand this happened all the time.
The flaw in this picture was revealed by the metaphor of "default rules," a concept recently imported by Law and Economics
scholars from corporate law theory into contract theory. 13 The
default rule metaphor revealed that, except in rare .circumstances, the law of contract applied only presumptively, and could
be "rebutted" by the manifested assent of the parties. This com11. See, e.g., Federal Communications Commission v. Beach Communications, Inc., 113
S. Ct. 2096, 2102 (1993):
[T] hose attacking the rationality of the legislative classification have the burden
"to negative every conceivable basis which might support it," •••. Moreover,
because we never require a legislature to articulate its reasons for enacting a
statute, it is entirely irrelevant for constitutional purposes whether the conceived
reason for the challenged distinction actually motivated the legislature•.•• In
other words, a legislative choice is not subject to courtroom fact-finding and may
be based on rational speculation unsupported by evidence or empirical data.
Justice Stevens took issue with this standard: "In my view, this formulation sweeps too
broadly, for it is difficult to imagine a legislative classification that could not be supported
by a 'reasonably conceivable state of facts.' Judicial review under the 'conceivable set of
facts' test is tantamount to no review at all." /d. at 2106 (Stevens]., concurring).
12. Is it too cynical to suggest that the philosophy of Legal Realism is dispensable when
one has the votes? Or would this be the epitome of realism?
13. See, e.g., Symposium on Default Rules and Contractual Consent, 3 S. CAL. INTERDJSCIPLI·
NARY L. REv. 1-444 (1993).
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pletely reversed the image that had been widely accepted, until
recently, that contract law was imposed on contracting parties.
For it turned out that contact law was only "imposed" on those
parties who chose to accept it by remaining silent. 14 In this way,
when parties who are rationally informed about the background
default rules of contract law choose to remain silent on a matter
governed by the default rules provided by contract law, we may
conclude that they have consented to the use of these rules
should a dispute arise.
In addition, when contracting parties are not rationally informed about the background default_ rules of contract law, their
silence may still be meaningful enough to influence the selection
of default rules adopted by a legal system. Lon Fuller had long
ago observed that even when persons are not "conscious" of a
particular fact, they pervasively make what he called "tacit assumptions" about these facts:
Words like "intention," "assumption," "expectation" and "understanding" all seem to imply a conscious state involving an
awareness of alternatives and a deliberate choice among them.
It is, however, plain that there is a psychological state which
can be described as a "tacit assumption" that does not involve
a consciousness of alternatives. The absent-minded professor
stepping from his office into the hall as he reads a book "assumes" that the floor of the hall will be there to receive him.
His conduct is conditioned and directed by this assumption,
even though the possibility that the floor has been removed
does not "occur" to him, that is, is not present in his mental
processes. 15

Another term for a tacit assumption is a presumption. We all presume a great deal about the world-far more than we could ever
articulate, even to ourselves. The fact that these presumptions
are not always present in our "consciousness" does not make
them any less real. 16 Nor does it make our manifestations of assent any less conditional on their turning out to be accurate.
Consciousness itself is a bit more complicated than those con-

14. The analysis presented here is explained at greater length in Randy E. Barnett, The
Sound of Silence: Default Rules and Contractual Consent, 78 VA. L. REv. 821 (1992).
15. LoN L. FuLLER, BASIC CoNTRAcr LAw 666-67 (1947).
16. See PaulJ. Heald &James E. Heald, Mindlessness and the Law, 77 VA. L. REv. 1127,
1137 (1991) ("Decisionmaking proceeds from both conscious and nonconscious states of
awareness.").
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tract scholars who limited the notion of contractual consent to
conscious assent appear to have assumed. 17
Moreover, once this is recognized, if contractual consent is to
be facilitated, the substance of contract law should be determined with at least one eye on those circumstances that would
prevent parties from "contracting around" those rules of contract
law with which they might disagree. So, for example, if it would
be rational for one-shot players in a small transaction to remain
ignorant about the background default rules of contract law,
then contract law perhaps should reflect what most such parties
would have wanted, in an effort to discern what these parties did
implicitly want. 18 And should rationally ignorant one-shot players
do business with rationally informed repeat players, the default
rules of contract should be chosen to reflect the likely tacit assumptions of the rationally ignorant. In this way, the rationally
informed would be induced to reveal to the other party when
they might wish to deviate from the tacit understanding of the
other party, thus informing the rationally ignorant by their bargaining behavior that they wished to play by counter-intuitive
rules. 19 By this process, the manifested assent of both parties
would be brought into closer correspondence to their actual
assent.
In sum, parties who are rationally informed about the background rules of contract can be said to have consented to any
default rule regardless of its content. However, given that many
persons are rationally ignorant, the default rules of contract law
should be chosen to reflect the conventional tacit assumptions of
rationally ignorant parties. In this way, when two rationally ignorant parties are contracting with one another, such "conventionalist" default rules are likely to represent their actual intentions;
and when a rationally ignorant party is contracting with a rationally informed party, such conventionalist default rules will induce
the rationally informed party to reveal by its bargaining behavior
that it wishes to deviate from the norm and thereby educate the
rationally ignorant party of this fact. In either event, the objective
manifestation of assent is brought into closer alignment with the
subjective assent of the parties. 20
17.
18.
19.
20.

See DANIEL C. DENNETr, CoNSCIOUSNESS ExPLAINED (1991).
See Barnett, supra note 14, at 88().83.

/d. at 886-92.
I have defended and elaborated this view in •.• and Contractual Consent, 3 S. CAL.
INTERDISCIPUNARY L. REv. 421 (1993).
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Thus was the traditional Legal Realist image of contract law
reversed by the concept of presumptions. The law of contract was
ordinarily not simply to be imposed on the parties by the legal
system for reasons of principle or policy wholly unrelated to the
parties' consent, as.generations of realist and post-realist contract
scholars had maintained. Instead, the default rules of contract
law operate presumptively. Contractual consent is served rather
than displaced when default rules are formulated either to reflect the tacit assumptions of most contracting parties, or to induce bargaining behavior that serves better to inform the parties
about the rules by which their relationship will be governed.
Having observed the power of presumptions in both the public
and private law spheres, the publication of Richard Gaskins's new
book, Burdens of Proof in Modern Discourse, 21 seemed to me unusually timely. In it he documents the use of presumptions in political and legal discourse, including constitutional law:
Although the authority of federal courts to review legislative
and executive actions was effectively asserted early in the nineteenth century, bitter struggles have continued into the present day on whether federal and state legislation enjoys a
presumption of constitutionality. After decades of intricate manipulation, this phrase has become virtually meaningless, but the
underlying concept figures heavily in contemporary debate
over judicial activism. Under ChiefJustice Warren in the 1950s
and 1960s, the United States Supreme Court to inject more
authority and flexibility into judicial review, while trying to
maintain the Court's traditional image as an impartial tribunal. Much of that flexibili!Y came from adjusting the presumption of constitutionality.22
.

Gaskins maintains that this phenomenon is pervasive.
Legislatures and administrative bodies build presumptions
into legal standards as way of structuring the inevitable uncertainties of implementation.... By allocating in advance certain procedural and evidentiary burdens among relevant
interest groups, legislation favors substantive outcomes that
defy the bland and balanced rhetoric one finds in many
statutes....
Controversies about proof and metaphors of sensory verification occur at all levels of the judicial hierarchy, frequently
masking deeper conflicts over public values. Appeals courts
derive conclusions of law from the fact that no evidence in
21. RicHARD H. GASKINs, BuRDENs OF PROOF IN MooERN DiscoURSE (1992).
22. !d. at 21-22.
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contradiction was introduced at trial, or at least insufficient
evidence. In most such cases, the nature and salience of evidence are more important than sheer quantity. To close the
gap between quantity and quality of evidence, a structure of
presumptions must cut through complex social ambiguities.
For example, the defendant in a discrimination suit may have
to prove an absence of subjective bias. The opponent of pornography may be forced to demonstrate a causal connection
between the printed page and social behavior.
The rationale for judicial decisions in such cases can be
stated in terms of evidence, but the underlying issue is about
presumptions: what conclusions can be drawn from controversial or indeterminate evidence-that is, from ignorance in
its many guises? When exactly is evidence good enough to
meet the implicit burdens lurking in legal rules? In short,
where is the dividing line between proof and ignorance, and
what follows from inconclusive data? The institutionalized
procedures of law force us to confront these questions rather
than treating them as painlessly settled by nature or custom. 23

And the same phenomenon is pervasive in legal scholarship as
well.
Participants in this Symposium address different implications
of the pervasive reliance on presumptions that Gaskins describes.
Ronald Allen and Dale Nance approach these issues as evidence
scholars. As Ron Allen explains,24 evidence scholars, more than
any other group, have attempted to analyze the concept of presumptions and the appropriate allocation of burdens of proof.
He contends that "[e]ver since evidence emerged as a discipline,
its very point has been to administer the problems that result
from the interaction of data with the background and experience of the decision maker. "25 In his article, Allen provides a
useful bibliography of evidence scholarship on this issue. He
then summarizes the fruits of this research and faults Gaskins for
not adequately taking this body of learning into account. Allen
identifies the different functions performed by presumptions
and burdens of proof, and how these functions have influenced
the particular allocation of such burdens in different contexts.
He notes that "the problem can be just as much complexity as
ignorance. The concern is not just with some limited data set,
but with the virtually infinite data sets represented by the human
23. I d. at 22-23 (citations omitted).
24. Ronald]. Allen, Burdens ofProof, Uncertainty, and Ambiguity in Modem LegalDi.scourse,
17 HAR.v.J.L. & Pus. PoL'Y 627 (1994).
25. Id. at 640.
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decisionmakers...."26 Allen's contribution is a wonderfully concise introduction to the complexities of evidence scholarship that
bears on the issue of presumptions, arguments from ignorance,
and burdens of proof.
Dale Nance moves the discussion in another, intriguing direction.27 Ronald Dworkin long ago argued that all of law is not
reducible only to "rules," but that it consists also of "principles." 28
In many doctrinal fields today, however, the challenge would be
to sort through the principles to find any rules at all. Still, perhaps because it is developed by judges and lawyers to govern
their own conduct, rather than that of ordinary c~tizens, evidence
law remains a bastion of legal rules. As part of his project of
identifying the mcyor principles lurking beneath these rules, 29
Nance identifies, explains, and normatively defends what he calls
the "principle of civility":
One ought to presume, until sufficient evidence is adduced to
show otherwise, that any given person has acted in accordance
with serious social obligations. As a corollary, how much evidence is "sufficient" depends upon the nature and severity of
the alleged breach, as well as the nature and severity of the
contemplated consequences of a determination of breach. 30
He contends that this principle is superior to competing theories
of evidence, such as those based solely on empirical accuracy or
on statistical probability, in explaining how the law allocates burdens of proof. To establish this claim, he applies his analysis to
both the criminal and civil law contexts. Moreover, Nance argues
that the adoption of such a principle is at the heart of a liberal or
pluralist community.31 And, like the phenomena of presumptions, once this principle is identified, one notices its application
everywhere.
Whereas Dale Nance's article is at the intersection of evidence
law and more normative analysis, the contributions by Lawrence
Solum, Mark Rosen, and Gregory Klass and Gustavo Faigenbaum
rest squarely in the arena of deontological moral theory. In par26. Id. at 641.
27. Dale A. Nance, Civility and the Burden of Proof, 17 HARv. J.L. & PUB. PoL'Y 647
(1994).
28. Ronald M. Dworkin, The Model of Rules, 35 U. CHI. L. REv. 14 (1966).
29. See Dale A. Nance, The Best Evidence Principle, 73 IowA L. REv. 227 (1988).
30. Nance, supra note 27, at 648.
31. See Nance, supra note 27, at 653 ("[T]o presume that someone has breached his or
her duty fails to accord that person the dignity associated with the status of membership in
the community that is governed by the norms whose breach is at issue.").
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ticular, they each examine whether the use of presumptions or
arguments from ignorance either commits one to a transcendental realm of values or permits one to avoid recourse to such a
realm.
Lawrence Solum applies rational choice or decision theory to
reveal how burdens of proof assist decisionmaking confronted by
two distinct problems of uncertainty: risk and ignorance. 32 The
problem of risk concerns the ability to make rational decisions
when probabilities can be assigned to various outcomes of our
decisions. In contrast, the problem of uncertainty is the problem
of making rational decisions in the face of ignorance or an absence of information-even about the probabilities of outcomes.
According to Solum, when dealing with the problem of risk, rational choice theory suggests that burdens of proof should be
chosen to minimize the chances of an erroneous decision. When
burdens of proof are used to deal with uncertainty, however, our
ignorance of the probability of error prevents such a strategy. 33
Drawing upon his previous scholarship concerning the destruction of evidence,34 Solum suggests that under conditions of ignorance, burdens of proof should be allocated to facilitate some
end, such as deterrence or fairness. 35 Solum also contests Gaskins' claim that when assigning burdens of proof to deal with
uncertainty, we are necessarily making a transcendental truthclaim. He argues that neither the presumptions adopted to deal
with risk nor those intended to deal with ignorance need make
such claims.36 Solum concludes by denying Gaskins's contention
that using constructs, such as Dworkin's metaphor of Hercules37
or John Rawls' "original position," entail a commitment to discovering transcendent truths. 38
Mark Rosen examines the issue of whether the judicial allocations of burdens of proof can be justified on the grounds that
such allocations reflect a transcendent truth. While accepting
Gaskins's thesis that when judges allocate burdens of proof they
implicitly claim for their decisions the status of transcendent
32. Lawrence B. Solum, You Prove It! Why Should !?, 17 HARv. J.L. & Pun. PoL'Y 691
(1994).
33. !d. at 697.
34. JAMIE S. GoREUCK, STEPHEN j. MARzEN & LAWRENCE B. SoLUM, DESTRUCTION oF
EVIDENCE (1985).
35. Id. at 699.
36. Id. at 671.
37. Id. at 702-704.
38. !d. at 704-706.
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truth, Rosen questions the institutional competence of the judiciary to make such a claim. 39 Rosen contends thatjudicial resolutions of social disputes are "reified" as transcendental truths for
two reasons. First, viewing judicial decisions as morally right legitimates the use of governmental power. Second, it seems to avoid
the positivist problem of obeying whatever laws may happen to
be enacted. Nonetheless, Rosen argues that "courts should be
divested of their generally-perceived authority to identify transcendental truth." 4 ° Contending that "the project of coexistence
is the most that can be collectively pursued at the national level
in a noncoercive pluralistic State,"41 he argues that judicial decisions should be viewed as containing an implicit disclaimer:
The justification for allowing/proscribing the activity in question is merely that this outcome is consistent with society's
consensus that a diverse citizenry should coexist without undue coercion. This is a practical resolution that makes no
claims to clarify disputed transcendental issues.42
Ending the section on the relationship between the allocation
of burdens of proof and the issue of transcendence is the contribution by Gregory Klass and Gustavo Faigenbaum.43 They examine critically and attempt to elaborate upon the Hegelian
analysis of the problem of arguing from ignorance that is offered
by Richard Gaskins in his book. 44
The Symposium concludes with two papers that seek to use the
concept of presumptions to illuminate different bodies of substantive law. Tamar Frankel attempts to explain how presumptions are used in corporate law to achieve the difficult balance
between stability and change.45 She identifies and then applies
four categories of presumptions that are used for this purpose:
(i) experience-based presumptions, for example, the presumption that in financial matters, most people will act in
their own self-interest rather than in the interest of others; (ii)
tradition-based presumptions, for example, that people will
follow the trodden path, which undergirds the rule that direc39. Mark D. Rosen, Difrocking the Courts: Resolving "Cases or Controversies," Not Announcing Transcendental Truths, 17 HARv.J.L. & PUB. PoL'Y 715 (1994).
40. Jd. at 729.
41. Jd. at 727.
42. Jd. at 729-30.
43. Gregory M. Klass & Gustavo Faigenbaum, The Enlightenment of Dialectics: Strategies
Involved in Burdens of Proof, 17 HARv. J.L. & PUB. PoL'Y 735 (1994).
44. See GASKINS, supra note 21, at 240-272.
45. Tamar Frankel, Presumptions and Burdens of Proof as Tools for Legal Stability and
Change, 17 HARv.J.L. & Pua. PoL'Y 759 (1994).
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tors must properly inform themselves and deliberate before
making decisions; (iii) presumptions of legality, legitimacy,
and orderliness, for example, that corporate directors were legally elected, and that fiduciaries hold and manage other people's money in accordance with the law; and (iv) initial
presumptions in favor of defendants. 46

Richard Gaskins, whose book provoked this Symposium, closes it
by applying his analysis of presumptions to the legislation creating administrative agencies charged with dealing with problems
of children and of families. 47 He argues that when such statutes
are viewed as creating multiple competing default rules-as opposed to rules simpliciter-to govern inevitably complex
problems, they are not as contradictory as to some they may
seem.
Au Revoir to the I.H.S. Annual Symposium on Law and

Philosophy
For the past ten years it has been both my responsibility and
my pleasure to serve as the intermediary between three outstanding institutions: the Harvard Journal of Law and Public Policy at
Harvard Law School, the Institute for Humane Studies at George
Mason University, and the Veritas Fund, Inc., of Wichita, Kansas.
Starting at a time before symposium issues oflaw reviews were in
vogue, we have worked together to produce nine annual issues
devoted to law and philosophy. Over the years, we have featured
writings by both senior and younger scholars, including graduate
and law students, and have drawn attention to the seminal work
of such theorists as Jules Coleman,48 Frederick Schauer,49 and
Ernest Weinrib. 50 We have also tackled the thorny issue of reconciling moral rights and consequentialist modes of analysis.5 1
Some years ago, when the annual expenses of this publication
began to exceed the income being produced by the trust, it was
decided by the trustees of Veritas that this project was so important that it should be funded out of the corpus. This meant, of
46. Id. at 760.
47. Richard H. Gaskins, Default Presumptions in Legislation: Implementing Children's SenJo
ices, 17 HARv.J.L. & Pun. PoL'v 779 (1994).
48. See Symposium on Risks and Wrongs, 15 HARv. J.L. & Pun. PoL'Y 621-963 (1992).
49. See Symposium on Law and Philosophy, 14 HARv. J.L. & Pun. PoL'Y 615-852 (1991).
50. See Symposium on Legal Formalism: American Association of Law Schools Section on Law
and Interpretation, 16 HARv. J.L. & Pun. PoL'Y 579-682 (1993).
51. See, e.g., Symposium on Law and Philosophy, 11 HARv. J.L. & Pun. PoL'Y 597-836
(1988).
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course, that one day our funding would elapse. And now it has.
Thus it is time for me to thank one final time the Institute for
Humane Studies, the trustees of the Veritas Fund, and the editors of
the Journal. In particular I wish to express my appreciation to Jason Levine, this year's Editor-in-Chief. I have had the good fortune to deal with nine incredibly bright and capable Editors-inChief, and Jason has been among the very best of an impressive
group. Finally, I want to thank my old friend Walter Grinder of
the Institute. It was Walter's initiative and encouragement that got
this project off the ground so many years ago, and whatever success we have achieved was made possible by his patient and farsighted guidance.
We have had a good run.

